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This article addresses a long-held dispute across social science disciplines: that market and 
moral economies are distinctly different and even contradictory. This debate was never re-
solved, and was also problematic, as both sides did not address either competing claims, not 
empirical reality, with sufficient rigor and care. I suggest revisiting the original Scott-Popkin 
debate afresh, while exploring whether moral and market economy explanations are comple-
mentary, rather than contradictory. I posit that market and moral economies, as phenomena, 
are intertwined, and that a proper approach treats both framing (norms) and decisions (calcu-
lation) as embedded in fields. Actors have historically articulated moral economies of norms 
as well as interests, thus underpinning market and other economies. The author posits three 
possibilities for a future framework of moral economy: moral economies as transformative; 
moral economies as anchored in concrete entities, rather than as free-floating norms; and 
moral economies as multiple, embedded in field contexts. Using these approaches to moral 
economy, I give brief examples of economic transformations that involved not only interests 
and markets, but also moral claims.
Keywords: moral economy, economic development, interests, norms, fields, economic history.
The Unfinished Debate: Moral and Market Economies
Populism has returned with a vengeance: average “rational actors” have shown they 
are willing to support politicians and policies that are far from optimal to their interests 
and well-being: working class supporters for Donald Trump who do not benefit from 
tariffs, attacks on health care, and diversion of funds from infrastructure to a border wall 
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of dubious use; working class and other Britons consistently supporting a Brexit process 
that likely will leave them, and others worse off; and so on. This contemporary atmosphere 
brings us back to a different time, when countries were politically charged and revolution 
was in the air: and in that decade of the 1960s, sociologists, historians, anthropologists, 
and political scientists posited that a “moral economy” had come into contradiction with 
relations and logics of capitalism. Economists and some political scientists responded 
with theories of rational action and positive political economy, defending claims that peo-
ple are homo economicus and that economies are, at heart, not about morals but about 
calculation vis-à-vis individual gain and market forces. This debate was, perhaps, at its 
starkest in the early 1980s, epitomized in the “Scott-Popkin debate,” named after the main 
protagonists, James C. Scott and Samuel Popkin (more on this below). 
Oddly enough, the debate was never truly settled — it is as if both sides retreated to 
their corners. On one side, economic sociologists and some political scientists rethought 
and sharpened their tools, taking interests into closer account but also reworking “power,” 
“culture,” and institutions. Economists did not engage in much rethinking at the time, al-
though change has come from other directions, notably behavioral economics and cogni-
tive psychology, while growing social inequality, the Great Recession of 2008, and empiri-
cal work by the late Alan Krueger and others have made a growing number of economists 
aware (even if belatedly) that the foundations of microeconomics and macroeconomics 
are more complicated than envisioned. Economics and economic sociology have made 
important advances that have also brought them into closer conversation and potential 
symbiosis, in contrast to the 1980s and earlier, when the two disciplines were in a constant 
state of intellectual contention. 
Yet, as economists pay closer attention to economic structures and networks, and as 
economic sociologists continue to make progress around economic culture (e. g. [Dob-
bin, 1994; Hass, 2011]), institutions and power [Roy, 1997] and fields [Fligstein, 2001; 
Fligstein, McAdam, 2012], what happened to the original positions in this important de-
bate from decades ago? One side, positive political economy, has not fared so well in the 
long run: not fared well: either cognitive foundations are increasingly under question, 
and politics and power have crept back into institutional accounts [Acemoglu, Robin-
son, 2006; 2010; 2012]. Moral economy has limped along  — not dead, and occasion-
ally invoked. Is there anything from moral economy to salvage and develop? Economic 
sociology has addressed culture and power, but not in the same systematized manner as 
for moral economy — which was a competing systematization of practice and context. 
Attempts to synthesize a general model of economic practice to compete with micro-
economics and macroeconomics usually involve acknowledging material and symbolic 
resources and appreciating that culture frames “utilities” (cf. [Fligstein, 1990; Roy, 1997]). 
This is especially clear in the ongoing convergence of sociological neoinstitutionalism 
(economic and organizational sociology) and social movement theory. But the power of 
moral economy was that it provided a coherent and contained universe of variables and 
causation that could be used to address economic practices, either in everyday life or in 
response to economic shifts.
In this paper, I suggest possibilities to revive moral economy. A developed framework 
is beyond the scope of this paper; it may be that no such coherent framework will ever be 
possible. But this does not mean we should not try. Therefore, I structure this account as 
possibilities and potential drawn from lessons and new insights.
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Revisiting Early Moral Economy:  
Nebulous Logics and Misspecified Debates 
Before rethinking moral economy and suggesting what could be, I first return to the 
intellectual history to make sense of what was useful and what was problematic, and what 
criticisms succeeded and failed (and what this tells us of any future possibilities for a new 
framework). The issue of how norms and economies interact is not itself all that new. 
While Adam Smith [Smith, 1976 (1776)] noted the importance of self-interest for eco-
nomic exchange, earlier he suggested that norms and especially empathy were also impor-
tant underpinnings of systems of exchange [Smith, 2006 (1759)] — an argument not so 
distant from Emile Durkheim’s proposition on the non-contractual bases of contractual 
relations [Durkheim, 1997  (1893)]1. The importation of notions of justice into econo-
mies goes far back into history, although when we approach modernity, with the expan-
sion of formalized institutions (especially the modern state), socialist movements became 
important carriers of notions that justice and norms were a crucial basis to economics, 
and to effective progressive economies in particular. (Karl Marx decoupled norms from 
the economy with his claim that the river of history leads to communism—a just society 
would result regardless of norms articulated.) However, as a systematized account of how 
economic practices operate, “moral economy” is probably best known in relation to the 
formulation by James C. Scott and Samuel Popkin’s rational choice critique, which teased 
out two models of economic practice [Scott, 1976; Popkin, 1979]. True, there had been 
emerging analyses that integrated norms, structural positions and relations, and econo-
mies in an increasingly systematic fashion, arguing that normatively grounded systems of 
economic practices could come into conflict with economic relations grounded in self-
interest [Wolf, 1968; Thompson, 1971; Moore, 1966; 1978; Paige, 1975], although many of 
these analyses focused more on the triggers and politics of rebellion that on the normative 
foundations of alternative economic systems2. 
Scholars debated moral economy and positive political economy3 to explain respons-
es to economic change (e. g. peasant protest of encroaching capitalism), which were either 
a collective defense of traditional norms enabling subsistence and survival and that were 
effused with notions of justice; or instrumentally rational calculation of costs and benefits 
of adapting to or resisting capitalism [Bates, 1981; 1983; Alt, Shepsle, 1990]. The original 
formulation stated that logics of a moral economy: were informal rather than formalized 
relations; operated in agrarian or early industrial communities whose members held to 
“traditional” beliefs; were oriented to collective norms (e. g. reciprocity and redistribu-
1 One could go further back, even to Greek philosophy, to find variations on these arguments. How-
ever, most of those early discussions concerned ought (should norms matter for economic practices), rather 
than is (how significant are norms in social reality). The latter is at the heart of the Scott-Popkin and related 
debates. Further, the issue of norms systematized into a wider set of economic practices — an economy of 
norms, to oversimplify — is more apparent in later work. Hence, I begin my discussion with the 1970s.
2 Karl Polanyi [Polanyi, 1944] did argue that “natural” economic practices (conforming to real human 
nature) were grounded in norms of reciprocity and redistribution. Market economies require that states 
subordinate these to rational calculation by creating a market society. A complementary analysis, focusing 
on discourses, is Albert Hirschman’s history of the rising dominance of “interests” over “passions” as the 
basis for “normal” practice [Hirschman, 1977].
3 I distinguish between “positive political economy”, grounded in rational choice microeconomics, 
from traditional “political economy”, in which power is central to analysis but microfoundations are left 
open.
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tion) rather than to calculation for individual gain; and were grounded in popular sov-
ereignty. Moral economy involved reciprocity and redistribution in a collectively rational 
survival strategy — subsistence values and their ritualized practices came under threat 
when the local economy was incorporated into broader capitalist markets. For urban 
dwellers reacting to high bread prices in eighteenth century England or on the eve of the 
French Revolution, saving themselves meant saving tradition; their moral economy was 
rational and normative. Traditional norms “from below” that provided ammunition for 
resistance to encroaching commodification of land and labor under capitalism and new 
relations of power to elites. This seemed to explain why the expansion of capitalism led to 
agrarian revolts in developing countries and urban unrest in the early stages of capitalist 
development. 
Samuel Popkin’s response, called “political economy” but closer to “market economy,” 
posited that individual peasants were rational actors aiming to maximize utility — peasant 
life was more entrepreneurial than survival-based — and who supported rebellion or col-
lective norms if this brought gains. Peasant action was not grounded in defending tradi-
tion versus market capitalism: rather, peasants used opportunities to advance their inter-
ests4. Following Popkin’s logic of markets as state of nature, Robert Bates (alone and with 
collaborators) argued moral economy was suboptimal, that there are no rational grounds 
for moral economy, and there should be no trace of it empirically (e. g. [Bates, Curry, 
1992]). “Positive political economy” focused primarily on conditions of collective action; 
participants’ actual claims were not important, as is typical in rational choice explanations 
(i. e. actors are lying or oblivious to real utility and interests). One rational choice explana-
tion as to why Scott’s peasants followed a moral economy was that social mechanisms in 
those communities maintained collective norms; such mechanisms were absent for Pop-
kin’s cases. McKean [McKean, 2000] countered that monitoring and sanction were more 
effective in the peasant communities Scott examined — hence the collective “moral econ-
omy” seemed to work. Popkin’s peasant communities did not have effective monitoring 
and sanction, and so his measured implied more opportunistic, instrumentally rational 
behavior. This is a tantalizingly elegant: simple axioms of rational choice explain varia-
tion (although it assumes instrumental, calculative rationality where it might not exist, cf. 
[Reddy, 1984]).
Critiques by Popkin, Bates, and others provoked important correctives to alterna-
tive theories, cultural approaches in particular. The most important contribution might 
have been to question the quasi-Durkheimian logic of initial moral economy arguments 
that collective rationality is an inherent trait of premodern groups, while individual, in-
strumental rationality is a trait of modern societies (cf. [Granovetter, 1993]). As well, like 
much rational-choice based scholarship, these critiques pointed to the importance of re-
sources and opportunities affecting costs of action. Collective, redistributive norms do 
not necessarily bring the collective utility Scott and others imagined; action can be driven 
by attempts to gain (wealth, power, etc.); and such economies ultimately have a political 
dimension that collective norms a la the original moral economy formulation glossed 
over. Further, the original moral economy dangerously risked traps of oversocialization 
and making people into “cultural dupes” that many sociological analyses suffered [Gran-
4 Popkin [Popkin, 1979] could set up this argument by claiming that, in the moral economy perspec-
tive, traditional peasants were inherently anti-market, not strategically. To be wary of encroaching market 
capitalism because it threatens an established order is not being inherently anti-market, however.
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ovetter, 1985]. However, other aspects of the political economy critique and alternative 
also missed the mark or overstated insights. First, implicit (and sometimes explicit) in 
rational-choice based approaches is the brushing off of actors’ own claims as window-
dressing to real motives that can be ascertained only from actions. Subsequent scholarship 
took seriously the claims of social actors more seriously and related them to structures and 
opportunities, and noting how moral economy did in fact possess explanatory power that 
“political economy” could not. 
One glaring error of both approaches was the assumption that moral and political 
economies are contradictory or competing forms of behavior: tradition versus innovation, 
norms versus interests. This need not be the case, as I will argue. The traditional meaning 
of “political economy” involves relations of power and economy, especially the state’s role. 
Economies, as social relations, are not devoid of norms or power or interests. In fact, we 
can speak of moral economy as the “culture” side of the power-culture relation, and it was 
not long before conceptualizations of culture and its relation to power and structure im-
proved. By taking agency and interests seriously, but linking them to norms as 1) founda-
tions for normal economic relations that shape perceived interests, and simultaneously as 
2) tools for making claims about normal economic relations and rules, we can incorporate 
interests and norms into an improved moral economy that makes politics not reactive, 
but potentially proactive, and allows us to envision economies not only as aggregates of 
economic actors with their interests, but also as fields of rules.
Moral Economy a Second Time Around: Possibilities and Potential 
One weakness of earlier moral economy formulations was its nebulousness: a gener-
alized sense of collective norms of reciprocity, subsistence, and redistribution applicable to 
a community or society, and seemingly homogenous to that group. Anything was poten-
tially governed by a broad moral economy5. However, this is restrictive and a reification: 
just as “economy” is reified as a distinct, autonomous, natural social space (cf. [Mitchell, 
2002]), moral economy was reified as a natural traditional human inclination writ large 
onto communal norms of survival. Yet there is no need theoretically to limit the concept. 
If we relax original empirical restrictions (agrarian communities) and consider authority 
and claims-making dimensions, we see moral economies at work even in modern econo-
mies, and some scholars still find utility in the concept for analyses of modern economies, 
classes, and states. Capitalism and commodification no longer encroach, they reign; but 
this need not mean moral economy is irrelevant6. 
5 In a market economy, everything is governed by cost-benefit calculus. Actors’ interests are taken 
as given. This allows for variation in interests and actions, and for conflict. Unfortunately, original moral 
economy did not.
6 It might seem, in this argument, that “market economy” is static and invariant: there is only one type 
of market economy across space and time. This is not so. First, there is variation across space and time in 
how market logics are applied or regulated; the later section on empirical vignettes will hint at this. Second, 
and potentially more important, is that the usual “market economy” so central to Anglo-American eco-
nomic theory is, in fact, one way to structure the expression and manifestation of instrumental rationality, 
and that moral logics shape that structuring. Instrumental rationality as individual behavior is not unnatu-
ral, nor is it the predominant form of human rationality; but its expression as in institutions and routinized 
practices is a different story. This is Polanyi’s thesis [Polanyi, 1944].
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One first step is to rethink moral economy, and I conceptualize moral economy as a 
set of fundamental expectations of legitimate relations, goals, and practices of exchange, 
production, and setting of value. Another possible adjustment would be to make moral 
economy less coherent and systematic: for example, reframing moral economy as a tool 
kit of norms and strategies, rather than as uniform collective norms. This would bring 
in agency, as actors would use moral economy norms for claims-making or to guide or 
justify decisions, economic and political. However, this is also perhaps too costly: moral 
economy loses predictive and some explanatory power that the original formulation sup-
posedly had. An alternative is to take a field approach [Martin, 2011], in which interests 
and norms are structured, but in a relational manner. Rather than being a set of norms for 
all time — e. g. for all peasant communities, as in the original moral economy formula-
tion — we have norms and interests anchored in contexts, in particular relations for a par-
ticular place and time. This makes moral economy more than just norms used strategically 
as tools, and grounds those norms in social relations (power, institutions, etc.) of a con-
text; but it also allows us to bring in politics and interests, that can vary across contexts7. 
If we take a field approach, we look for actors maneuvering vis-à-vis each other, in the 
economic field (e. g. self-regulation of competition) and the political field (e. g. attempts to 
shape state regulation of the economy, or adjust to it). In a sense, Neil Fligstein [Fligstein, 
1990; 2001] made a similar argument in his field analysis of markets and corporations: 
corporate elites were driven to realize interests, especially optimizing income and profits 
and create stable markets and economic certainty. How they did so was by institutional-
izing norms of legitimate corporate strategies and structures, for example in how firms 
in the same field could compete with each other over time. While elites in different fields 
(e. g. automobile production, consumer durables) were regulating each other, the state 
was also regulating economic fields, for example by enforcing price competition or liber-
alizing financial practices for the benefit of corporate elites. Further, one important facet 
of fields — missing in the original moral economy formulation and that Popkin did draw 
attention to — is that field norms can also be tools for internal competition and field poli-
tics [Bourdieu, 1984]. If fields are norms and rules, then actors not only assume or follow 
those rules — they can also apply them strategically and even break them strategically for 
an advantage [Martin, 2011]. Additionally, fields are not simply norms that are free-float-
ing in some social or discursive space: they are likely to be anchored in particular entities 
of valence [Martin, 2011; Hass, 2017], i. e. entities that have institutional or other signifi-
cance, and around which actors orient not only norms, but also interests (and so fields 
and anchors ground interests as well). Finally, if we take a field approach, we can propose 
that a moral economy does not apply only to an entire economy — it can apply to smaller 
contexts (e. g. sectors) or relations (e. g. labor relations or relations between organizations 
in a particular sector of exchange, such as importers).
Thus, drawing on a field logic and scholarship that has emerged since the Scott-Pop-
kin debate, I propose three sets of possibilities and potentials: moral economies as trans-
formative and not merely defensive; moral economies as anchored and grounded; and the 
7 The logic of a field framework is that there are governing dynamics, but they are context-bound. One 
metaphor is fluid flow: equations reveal governing dynamics of fluid flow, but trajectories of fluid particles 
depends on the context — other particles and topography — rather than on some general context in all 
places and times.
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existence of multiple moral economies, some of which overlap with, rather than oppose, 
market economies.
Possibility 1. Moral Economies as Transformative, as well as Defensive
Our first possibility is that moral economies can be transformative, not only defen-
sive. Norms are not only bases for resistance, e. g. resisting encroaching capitalism. Actors 
can use norms to change situations, including improving their well-being or realizing in-
terests. A clear example of is from social movements. Modern states and elites use propa-
ganda and symbolic manipulation to create a “formula of rule” to legitimate authority, to 
create a misrecognition of power (hiding power relations), and to compel non-elites to 
obey. Non-elites, in turn, can use the formula of rule to their gain, for example by demand-
ing that regimes follow through on promises made in exchange for authority. (If elites do 
not do so, they risk inviting resistance, open or hidden, or at least cynicism and disbelief in 
their right to rule.) Modern state and political elites defend structural power and privilege 
by references to security, both physical (armies and police) and economic (welfare) — but 
this allows other actors, from corporations to average citizens, to demand that the state 
take steps to follow through on those promises. Some corporations can demand state sub-
sidies or tariffs not only to protect their interests, but especially to protect the national 
interest as a whole. Given its monopoly on violence and its symbolic predominance, the 
state is a natural locus of claims-making. Citizens and elites locate themselves not only in 
a matrix of material relations and interests, but in a symbolic-normative (meaning-laden) 
matrix as well. 
The survival of moral economy in the empirical world is not so unexpected after all. 
In her study of worker protest in modern Egypt, Posusney found that workers framed 
claims and protests in a moral economy logic: protests were set off by perceptions of injus-
tice and “takeaways” of rights and privileges in the context of a patron-client relationship 
with the state. The violation of this trade-off of rights and goods for loyalty drove worker 
protest, not purely or even primarily by opportunities for gain (rational choice) or class 
consciousness and organization (Marxism). Rather, workers’ own expectations and claims 
were couched in language of patron-client relations and expectations of rewards for loy-
alty; the timing of protest coincided with the sudden and seemingly unjust withdrawal of 
said rewards. As she noted, 
“in this [moral] economy, workers view themselves as being in a patron-client relationship with 
the state. The latter is expected to guarantee workers a decent wage by regulating their paychecks 
and by controlling prices on basic necessities; the government should also ensure equal treatment 
of workers performing similar jobs. Workers, for their part, provide the state with political 
support and contribute to the postcolonial national development project through their labor… 
[T]he superiority of the moral economy approach becomes clearer when one investigates the 
specific causes of workers’ protests. Virtually all of the incidents reported [in Egypt] grew out 
of the workers’ sense of injustice, a feeling that they were being denied something to which they 
were entitled” [Posusney, 1993, p. 89, 100].
In particular, state attempts to reduce incentive pay and to double insurance contri-
butions from workers’ paychecks set off strikes and protest; these were made worse by 
injustices over the gap in living conditions between workers and managers. Marxist ap-
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proaches cannot explain the irregularity and underdevelopment of class consciousness; 
rational choice explanations cannot 
“address the problem of why workers engage in protest for incremental gains that were not worth 
the risks before someone else had obtained them. There is no logical reason why the utility of 
these gains would suddenly change, so we must assume that the answer lies in the expectation 
of achieving them; that is, once some workers get the increase, it seems a winnable demand 
for others who had previously considered it unobtainable. This, however, means discussing how 
workers’ expectations from the state are derived, and that is the province of moral economy” 
[Posusney, 1993, p. 107–108].
Posusney’s Egyptian workers are not simply defending their interests; they are hold-
ing the state’s promises and claims of legitimate authority to account. In defending inter-
ests, Egyptian workers were also advancing their own interests — in this case, the author-
ity to make claims and to participate in discourse over what constituted normal, legitimate 
policy. Even defensive actions are offensive, as they are attempts to make voices heard and 
respected.
This is not so different from worker protests in 1905 and 1917 Russia: mixed with 
economic demands were claims related to defending and expanding rights for moral and 
normative reasons. Opportunistic as some might have been, Petrograd workers repeating 
Bolshevik slogans of “peace, bread, land” were making claims based on normative ideals 
of legitimate politics. While workers and soldiers were not entirely pro-Bolshevik, catego-
ries of their claims suggest the centrality of the normative dimension to collective action: 
these workers did not want pay raises alone, and collective protest succeeded against the 
free rider not merely because of surveillance and exclusive goods but because of a sense 
of community [Bonnell, 1983; Koenker, 1981; Koenker, Rosenberg, 1989]. In other words, 
while organizational and resource considerations are obviously crucial to action, symbolic 
and meaning dimensions of claims-making cannot be ignored in modern collective action 
[Snow, Benford, 1992].
Possibility 2. Moral Economies are Anchored and Grounded
One weakness of the original moral economy argument is that norms of economic 
practice were invariant across space and time (one moral economy for all), and nebulous. 
Peasant societies might have articulated similar norms and claims, given similar structural 
locations and interests; but moral economies need not be limited to peasants alone. A 
close examination of contentious economics — disputes over the economic role or use of 
resources — reveals that norms and claims are not general and generic, but actually an-
chored in concrete entities and relations. Put different, moral economies and their norms 
are grounded in concrete, specific entities and relations. 
One attempt to make this argument was from Thomas Arnold’s attempt to shift mor-
al economy to contextualized norms working through concrete objects [Arnold, 2001]. 
Moral economy is the assignment of sanctity to particular social goods. In Arnold’s case, 
scarce water in the American Southwest was not only of material value to Americans 
there. Water was also of symbolic interest to local residents. Attempts to channel water 
to California represented not only a threat to material interests (less water, thus more 
expensive, if it does not disappear), but also an assault on the very sense of local com-
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munity, which might be sacrificed for the well-being and higher status of residents on 
the west coast, which has more money and national status. Water may not be scarce and 
sacred in Seattle, and so it means less in Seattle’s politics and economy; in the Southwest 
it is rarer and thus is entangled in broader relations of status and power (i. e. who controls 
the water supply, locals or people far away?). This raises important points. First, what par-
ticular objects gain moral significance cannot be determined a priori but are contextual, 
empirical problematics. Second, moral economy is no longer a reactive template; it is part 
of discourse of contention, a symbolic dimension to conflict over resources. Third, the 
normative dimension returns to political and social action, structure, and contention. The 
battle over water is not just about interests; it is about the normative structure of the social 
body.
This is not an unexpected conceptual leap. Other work has expanded on aspects of the 
original moral economy formulation. William James Booth noted how moral economy is 
one set of norms and practices that embed exchange and set limits and logics of “nor-
mal” (not just “moral”) exchange and gain [Booth, 1993]. James C. Scott argued that labor 
relations could crystalize around entities of contentious use: for example, tractors and 
other technology in agricultural production [Scott, 1985]. Where landlords saw tractors 
as a means to improve labor productivity, peasants saw tractors as a leap in techniques of 
control and exploitation, and so they turned efforts to sabotage. Perhaps Viviana Zelizer’s 
work best encapsulates this new approach to moral economy, although she does not em-
ploy the concept herself. In her broad work on economic relations and meanings, Zelizer 
[Zelizer, 1979; 1985; 1997; 2005] reformulated economic culture as norms and meanings 
related to concrete entities, and embedded in the politics and economics of constructing 
those meanings. Framing and selling (i. e. marketing) life insurance involved articulating 
a moral economy of life. Initially, life insurance was not popular and profitable because 
sellers framed it in terms of interests and as a bet on life versus death: one “lost” the bet of 
survival, but one’s family gained, if the purchaser died earlier than the life insurance com-
pany expected. Life insurance gained popularity when it was reframed in terms of survi-
vors’ well-being: if the breadwinner died, life insurance would pay out so that his family 
would not be destitute. The financial product did not change, but what it was and why 
people should embrace it did: life insurance became a moral entity, such that breadwin-
ners would be acting immorally if they did not subscribe to it. And the anchor of valence 
for life insurance was the insured person’s body: first as the object of a wager, later as the 
source of well-being for the family. The economic meaning of children shifted, not only 
because of demographics (the shift from agriculture to industry and urbanization) and 
changes in labor law (restrictions on child labor). What children “meant” changed: from 
labor on the farm, to dependents who meant economic expenses rather than gain, but 
who should be framed as objects of love rather than labor. Whether life insurance, chil-
dren, money (fungible or categorized), or intimacy (emotional or imbued with a price), 
economic practices are structured by meaning systems expressed as norms and anchored 
around concrete entities. 
Possibility 3. Multiple Norms and Multiple Moral Economies 
In the original Scott-Popkin debate, both sides framed the issue as a stark contrast 
of models of human action, in which either norms or instrumental rationality predomi-
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nate8. This was a false dichotomy that has driven research and debate for too long. Rather, 
I suggest that Popkin’s rational choice-inspired “political economy” comes with its own 
sets of norms and justifications, just as Scott’s does9. Leaving aside the issue of the source 
of interests, interaction and exchange must have a cultural and normative basis to avoid 
spiraling out of control in an infinite regress of surveillance and enforcement. Norms, 
justifications, and claims of legitimacy and normality, even if used only instrumentally 
(e. g. by market cynics), provide a template of shared language and behavioral codes that 
create the certainty necessary for interaction in the first place. In political economy and 
economics, institutions are usually assumed to do this, although this begs the question of 
what institutions are in everyday reality. Thus, by reframing moral economy as concrete 
meanings embedded in relations of objects and practices, the original moral and politi-
cal economies become variant forms of logics of action, and our research agenda shifts: 
from proving one over the other, to analyzing how norms and interests coincide, how one 
shapes the other. Actors negotiate individual and collective incentives and norms (e. g. 
survival of self versus group, or survival of self versus cooperation for its own sake). 
Consider the following hypothetical example. A political economy approach to en-
vironmentalism might invoke corporations negotiating with the state over policies, and 
the state providing incentives (e. g. tax breaks) for using green technologies or fines for 
pollution. A moral economy analysis might include discourse over inherent value of the 
environment, and how corporate elites frame competing demands and values of short-
term profit versus longer-term environmental considerations, framed in monetary and 
non-monetary terms. One corporation may adopt green technologies for tax breaks, to 
appear legitimate, and to gain market share in green technologies; another might think 
of short-term profit, lobby the state for penalty exemptions, or try to avoid monitoring. 
The same political economy does not lead automatically to one set of responses; these 
are shaped by fields of meaning. Neither is moral economy hegemonic: meanings require 
some enforcement, and meanings are not entirely decoupled from status and power.
One intriguing possibility is systematizing forms of moral economy along two di-
mensions of logics of rationality. I propose two: individualist versus collective rationality; 
and formal versus substantive rationality. I do this partly because modernity highlights 
these two logics; also, these correspond to the opposite poles of potential game-theoretic 
behavior, especially for the Prisoners’ Dilemma that confronts wartime mobilization, sta-
bility, and survival. The first axis, individual-collectivist, refers to the more powerful locus 
of identity and loyalty. (While we all gain identity through collective rituals, that identity 
instilled may still embody sovereignty of the individual actor.) Scott and Popkin originally 
clashed along this axis. The second axis of formal versus substantive rationality is whether 
actors make decisions (e. g. distributing resources) according to calculation or to ultimate 
ends; this is similar to Max Weber’s distinction between instrumental and value-laden 
8 One example of limits to the conceptualization of “moral economy” is Stephen Wegren’s account of 
post-Soviet agriculture [Wegren, 2005]. Wegren sets up his model against Scott’s earlier version, suggest-
ing that moral economy is inevitably oriented towards resistance or outright rebellion. He then sets up an 
alternative involving institutions and elite framing to show adaptation. But this perpetuates a straw man.
9 One example of this is justifications by Ronald Reagan and neoliberals since the 1970s for undoing 
welfare and state regulation. Individual rational choice was not only human nature but also a moral position, 
cloaked in sanctity of individual autonomy and rights. Market capitalism and democracy were two sides of 
the same coin. If one was good, so was the other; embracing one meant embracing both. I briefly explore 
this case below.
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rationality [Weber, 1978, p. 24–26, 85–86]. (One might think of the distinction as practi-
cal/pragmatic versus ethical.) We have four sets of norms and logics of action: formally/
instrumentally individualist (individual interests are calculated before action is taken), 
formally/instrumentally collectivist (actions are calculated for group benefit), substan-
tively individualist (individualist action is the norm for its own sake), and substantively 
collectivist (collectivist action is the norm for its own sake). Note how these combinations 
essentially transform the initial contradictory nature of moral and political economies, 
now not opposing frameworks but different combinations of logics of action and identity. 
As a hermeneutic device, this can help us organize and analyze practices, claims, and 
justifications — and equally important, changes in these in the context of war, and tensions 
arising between different actors (different individuals in the same group or family, state 
officials versus citizens, etc.). Consider the dimensions of moral economy rationality in 
the following way (Figure)10.
15
Figure. Axes of logics of moral economies
If these dimensions and heuristics reveal variation in normative logics of economic organ-
ization and practice, these do not appear out of thin air to affect economies. Moral economy is no 
longer one invariant set of abstract or fuzzy norms that program people to act; it is articulations of 
“normality” played out in the context of institutions and other actors with interests and norms. Not 
only can moral economy encompass different logics of normality and legitimacy; those logics can 
crystalize into concrete rhetorical repertoires of economics and politics: categories and logics for 
making claims, in the boardroom or courtroom, about a legitimate, normal economy. Such reper-
toires might advance material interests, or normative considerations, or both: if social movement 
literature no longer demarcates theories as “interests versus culture”, but rather intertwines the two, 
why can we not do the same for economic practice?
MARKET AND MORAL ECONOMIES INTERSECT AND OVERLAP
The usual story of moral economy is as a counterweight to markets, and this is not unrea-
sonable in light of evidence. However, if we think of moral economy not as a nebulous set of 
collective norms and some conscience collective, but rather as a collectively available repertoire of 
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If these dimensions and heuristics reveal variation in normative logics of economic 
organization and practice, these do not appear out of thin air to affect economies. Moral 
economy is no longer one invariant set of abstract or fuzzy norms that program people to 
act; it is articulations of “normality” played out in the context of institutions and other ac-
tors with interests and norms. Not only can moral economy encompass different logics of 
normality and legitimacy; those logics can crystalize into concrete rhetorical repertoires 
of economics and politics: categories and logics for making claims, in the boardroom or 
courtroom, about a legitimate, normal economy. Such repertoires might advance material 
interests, or normative considerations, or both: if social movement literature no longer 
demarcates theories as “interests versus culture”, but rather intertwines the two, why can 
we not do the same for economic practice?
10 These examples are meant to be illustrative only, and as ideal types. One issue that I do not address 
is movement from one cell to the other. This would raise issues of politics and political economy beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
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Market and Moral Economies Intersect and Overlap
The usual story of moral economy is as a counterweight to markets, and this is not 
unreasonable in light of evidence. However, if we think of moral economy not as a nebu-
lous set of collective norms and some conscience collective, but rather as a collectively 
available repertoire of rhetorical and other tools for making claims, then we have an in-
teresting reinterpretation that keeps some of the old version of moral economy, but also 
expands out notion and overcomes this “either-or” logic of market versus moral economy. 
Namely, that the market economy of textbook economics and neoliberalism requires its 
own moral economy — its own repertoire — to make claims to advance, institutionalize, 
and defend market relations and practices (profit-seeking, commodification, accumula-
tion) as normal and legitimate.
England and the United States: Markets from Shifts in Moral Economies
While profit-oriented economic action was not unheard-of before the advent of capi-
talism, it was not the only driving force of trade: honor and general fulfillment of needs 
were also important motors of economic activity. Equally important was that economic 
practices, like much else, was grounded in reciprocity and redistribution. While we can 
argue about how central such norms were, they did exist and assert some significance, and 
not only in pre-capitalist societies11. In short, some version of the classic moral economy 
was at work in local English economies (and other areas as well). This does not mean 
that peasant and other communities were autonomous and self-governing, if poor; under 
feudalism, for example, norms of moral economy were not antithetical to inequalities of 
power and opportunity, and inherent in the feudal contract was a notion of fairness and 
defense, rather than pure exploitation or even commodification. 
The move to an economy grounded in accumulation and commodification — the cre-
ation of a “market economy” — required creating a market society. This project involved 
reducing or eliminating barriers to exchange, especially the power of guilds to control the 
movement and use of labor; of local welfare, that made labor inefficient; of local curren-
cies; and of barriers to trade. The impetus for such a project was not particularly strong 
until the coming of industry, even in its embryonic form, because the greater degree of in-
vestment required wider markets and longer-term economic stability to recoup debts and 
generate profits. This required creating a national market in England (and eventually in 
other countries)12. But that project, by itself, would have been clear to all as a naked grab 
for power — something that kings rarely did (and paid for dearly when they did, as did 
Richard II discovered). Thomas Malthus’ writings on population growth, and his claim 
about the inevitability of mass suffering and death as a result, normalized general hardship 
as a fact of God-driven nature — and thus not only inevitable, but as part of God’s nature, 
also legitimate. This legitimated attacks on local welfare, local barriers to the movement 
of goods and capital, and barriers to the expansion of a single currency across the English 
11 Some work in behavioral economics suggests the importance of the two, under notions of “justice” 
and “fairness.”
12 [Piore, Sabel, 1984] note similar dynamics, albeit with variation (mass production versus craft pro-
duction). Lachmann also notes a shift in perceptions of interests due to changes in state structures [Lach-
mann, 1990; 2002]. 
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realm. Eventually, the idea that poverty was perverse grew from this initial rationalization 
and moral defense of market society [Somers, Block, 2005]: a formula of normal economic 
organization in which markets and proper moral behavior went hand-in-hand, and to 
which Margaret Thatcher could return in the 1980s in her attack on the welfare state. 
Arguably, something similar has been at work in the United States. While the next 
section briefly discussed how moral economy shaped market economy in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, on another level, the fundamentals of a market economy are twins 
to a moral economy of individual liberty and responsibility  — especially on America’s 
right wing. Even if we grant material interests at work, those interests are articulated and 
defended through moral language and claims. What unites the Republican Party, the Koch 
brothers (billionaire brothers Charles and David Koch, who have financed Republican 
candidates and right-wing think tanks for many years), and the Tea Party are traditional 
norms that envision The Good as individual freedom not only to vote, but also to engage 
in economic activity (and get rich). Perhaps even more for non-elites, a fundamental mar-
ket economy is not so much grounded in those beliefs that hold sway at the University of 
Chicago (especially the Efficient market Hypothesis), but rather that markets are inher-
ently good — these groups articulate and support a moral economy of market institutions. 
The claim made popular by Milton and Rose Friedman, that markets and democracy have 
to go together, fits into this normative worldview. Again, partly this comes from interests: 
Republicans wanted to detach workers from the Democratic Party, and one way was to 
equate welfare with socialism. However, this only worked because there already were un-
derlying norms of the sanctity of individual autonomy and interests, and private property. 
Libertarians, the Koch brothers, and the Tea Party make interesting bedfellows precisely 
because a market of autonomous individuals negotiating the marketplace freely not only 
appeals to interests; and it is hard to see to whose interests such norms appeal, beyond the 
Koch brothers and their desire to reduce state regulation of the economy. More important 
is that markets are invoked to defend norms of autonomous individuals free of state in-
terference in their lives: the market defends individualism, and individualism defends the 
market13. 
Defending Markets versus Oligopolies
One tenet of the usual textbook economics is that monopolies and oligopolies are po-
tential threats to the autonomy and efficiency of market economies. Yet combatting them 
raises powerful contradictions for a market-oriented discourse: namely, that combating 
them requires state (or other) interference in the workings of a market economy. One 
could justify such interference on the grounds of expediency, but expediency does not 
provide much in the way of legitimacy by its very contingent and fleeting nature. Indeed, 
as Mancur Olson [Olson, 1982] noted, institutional concentration (e. g. monopolies of 
powerful unions) hinders the market-efficient flow of capital. However, how to combat 
them was outside his theory: all economic actors were out for gain, which leads to some 
form of market power and control. In short, like Karl Marx, Olson also foresaw the threat 
13 This also contributed to the Southern Strategy. To reduce the welfare state from which the majority 
of Americans benefited, the GOP had to frame welfare as anti-American, as welfare transferring wealth from 
hard-working whites to non-working non-whites. This was also to explain 1970s stagflation, even if it was 
wrong [Piore, Sabel, 1984].
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of oligopoly on many fronts leading to rent-seeking over adding value through innova-
tion. 
While it might be various actors’ interests to break oligopolies and monopolies, the 
justification for doing so requires moving beyond market theory, which either assumes 
markets correct on their own (a highly problematic assumption that only Republicans and 
University of Chicago faculty seem to believe with any consistency), or that some kind 
of interference is required. But what kind? While he did not invoke the concept of moral 
economy, Frank Dobbin [Dobbin, 1994] and William Roy [Roy, 1997] showed that cultur-
al constructions of a normal economy did matter in structuring economic relations and 
practices, and that norms of the proper position and activity of the state have been crucial 
to such structuring. The current construction of economic norms and organization — in 
particular, state distance from the economy except for policing monopolies and support-
ing price competition — was not inevitable. Before the recession of 1837, state-business 
interaction was seen as a way to support investment in railroads that private capital was 
unable or unwilling to do by itself, given the size of required investment and possible risks 
along the way. This positive assessment of state-business relations was not universal, but 
it was strong enough that Pennsylvania and Ohio worked with private investors to build 
railroads. Only after the 1837 recession did opinion sway against such close relations, and 
then for moral rather than truly practical reasons: state involvement threatened the crea-
tion of a powerful block of elite interests that would corrupt democratic representation 
[Roy, 1997]. Decades later, the Progressive Movement could make a similar argument to 
push for anti-monopoly legislation. As Roy and Dobbin [Roy, 1997; Dobbin, 1994] show, 
the real reason for the Sherman Anti-Trust Act and similar legislation was not primarily 
due to beliefs that monopolies would kill economic health: one only needed to look to 
France, Japan, or other countries to find refutations, and in fact the economic rationale 
came after the enactment of legislation, as a kind of theoretical justification. Rather, the 
argument for state interference against monopolies was that the concentration of capital 
threatened that locus of American sovereignty, local communities. That trust-busting coin-
cided with economic growth made it seem this was economically rational, when the reality 
of reforms was otherwise: it was a moral economy of sovereignty14. 
Post-Soviet Post-Socialism 
One way to frame the contention and even chaos of post-socialist, post-Soviet re-
forms is through this dichotomy of market versus moral economies15. The dynamics of 
interests and cultural frames is complex enough to fill two books [Hass, 2011; 2012], and 
14 A similar logic is at work for German ordoliberalism: this economic rationality was grounded in a 
particular concept of normal state-economy relations and a normal and legitimate economy.
15 One could argue that the Soviet economy was a “moral economy in power.” From superficial im-
pressions, the subordination of economic practices to broader social good — class justice and welfare pro-
vision — seems to fit the bill. However, that command economy was also oriented to military production 
and state and Party power. Paternalism of Soviet political economy was a moral economy, but one in which 
norms of collective provision and justice were intertwined with elite claims to authority. From this vantage 
point, capitalist elites (especially in conditions of growing inequality) and Soviet elites mirrored one an-
other: using claims about the moral superiority of state socialism (directed provision) or relatively unfet-
tered markets (individual freedom) to buttress structured inequality of power. But this broader issue and 
comparison are best left for their own separate analysis.
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so I keep my overview succinct. Market reforms might have been a solution to worsening 
provision of economic goods and services — but it also violated expectations that the state 
would continue to provide myriad public services to defend individual well-being and the 
common good. And this was no marginal facet of post-Soviet contention, especially in 
Russia: the response to rapid market reforms and market pain of “shock therapy” has been 
a seemingly classical Polanyian picture of society biting back, whether in support for anti-
reform forces in the first major post-Soviet elections of 1994 or in the initial support for 
Vladimir Putin, who made his name and legitimacy not only returning the Russian state 
to stability and power, but also by taming the oligarchical elite that had siphoned off much 
of the country’s wealth (which was not entirely untrue, either). Privatization was designed 
to improve economic performance by moving property into private hands, where incen-
tives and stimuli to improve investment and efficiency would be stronger [Hass, 2011, 
ch. 3, 5]. Evidence from privatization is mixed; not all privatized firms improved, and 
often became vehicles for rent-seeking. Such evidence came later, after battles had died 
down and policy was reality. Rather, the real battles were over notions of a normal and just 
economy, and contention erupted along several lines, with normative rhetoric overtaking 
instrumental rationality. Reforming elites, for example, saw privatization as a means not 
only to revive the economy, but especially to break the command economy, which was 
as or more “immoral” than “inefficient.” Enterprise workers, at the forefront of privatiza-
tion, saw the reform as a way to realize a true communist goal of worker ownership of the 
means of production — until it became clear that the game was rigged to outside owners, 
who would probably sell off enterprises for scrap or otherwise rent-seek. Soviet-era Red 
Directors tried to avoid privatization or use it to gain control of enterprises themselves, all 
the time under the banner of defending the worker collective.
The logics and rhetoric of claims and contention, then, were grounded in these differ-
ent moral economies: a moral economy of managerial paternalism and ultimate authority; 
a moral economy of market freedom, similar to that of global neoliberalism, that found its 
voice among market reformers and elite oligarchs; a moral economy of a socialist-market 
hybrid among workers, who saw in market reforms the hope of actually realizing social-
ism (ownership, empowerment, and well-being); and a moral economy of nationalism 
that reigns supreme today. Note that these are not only repertoires that legitimate politi-
cal action; they are also conceptions of what a normal, moral, legitimate economy looks 
like (worker-centered, manager-centered, elite-centered, state-centered). And those moral 
economies were institutionalized (even if temporarily) in the organization of property 
empires [Hass, 2011, ch. 5]: production-centered, finance-centered, and state-centered 
financial-industrial groups [Hass, 2018]. And that contention was not entirely a response 
to encroaching capitalism (Scott’s moral economy), nor solely an attempt to advance indi-
vidual gains (Popkin’s political or market economy). These were conflicts over construct-
ing a normal economy in a broad sense — the battle for a new, post-socialist civilization. If 
market economies require moral economies, then one challenge to Russians in the 1990s 
was creating the norms to legitimate and support particular interests and how to pursue 
them; one could argue that the current political economy is grounded in a more nation-
alist set of norms, creating a nation-centered moral economy underpinning a dirigiste 
political economy.
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Conclusion
Market economies require moral economies, not their elimination; the two can be 
complementary as well as contradictory. A moral economy as a set of norms that orient 
economic action, beyond commodification and accumulation, can restrain the expan-
sion and operation of market capitalism. It can also support of those practices. Market 
economies require justifications — not only moral justifications, but also epistemological 
foundations. Further, moral economies are part and parcel of power, whether the power 
to dominate and exploit, or the power to resist and buttress autonomy. And this is seems 
true not only for market capitalism, but also for Soviet socialism, peasant agriculture, or 
anything else. Pitting moral and market economies against each other, as theories of hu-
man economic behavior and organization, made just as little sense as juxtaposing interests 
and identities or interests and ideologies. One cannot be reduced to the other. If there is 
a “winner” in this contest, it is that norms provide not only tools to advance, defend, or 
obfuscate interests; they are also a template for making sense of our positions in the world, 
and what our interests are, should be, or could be. 
Recent years have shown the importance of bringing norms and moral economies 
back into the picture. Right-wing, nationalist populism, and less powerful but still present 
left-wing liberalism, have grown since the Great Recession of 2008 — and Karl Polanyi 
[Polanyi, 1944] suggested society can “bite back” if markets are relatively unfettered from 
norms that legitimate markets and tame them for some general well-being. According to 
Polanyi, the Great Depression drove non-elites towards the left (socialism) and the right 
(fascism) because both camps offered not only leaders and organization, but also because 
they offered moral critiques of market economies that caused pain, and moral founda-
tions for a new type of economy and polity. Increasing inequality under new global capi-
talism has obviously fed into the moral critiques (underdeveloped as they might be) of 
Brexiters, Donald Trump, the right-wing politicians elsewhere; the Great Recession only 
drove home how dangerous that inequality can be, and such danger was more powerfully 
articulated through moral language, rather than through mere appeals to interests. 
Mapping a new way to think of moral economy has only begun; I only suggest pos-
sibilities for moving forward. Moral economy seemed to matter for building laws and 
institutions to regulate economic practice: laws are not functions of elite interests alone. 
Further, the role of systematized norms in constructing local economic relations and prac-
tices of economic fields has been explored, but requires further study. In particular, are 
there particular norms that are more readily implemented or have a better fit with differ-
ent classes? This was part of the original moral economy formulation: peasants engaged 
in subsistence agriculture were more likely to embrace collective norms of reciprocity and 
redistribution, and perhaps this has been true for humans anywhere whose most impor-
tant decision is how to survive, rather than what type of smartphone to buy. Are there pat-
terns about the relation between structure and structural location (e. g. class, or race and 
ethnicity) and norms structured into a moral economy? That case is not so clear. Further, 
once upon a time, modernization theory posited that a particular set of norms was condu-
cive to economic growth: for example, deferred gratification, meritocracy, universalism, 
rule or law, and the like. Later scholarship showed that these norms were less important 
than location in the structure of the global economy, or resource endowments, or institu-
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tions (although institutions that promote merit and the rule of law might contribute to 
economic performance). 
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Моральная экономика: возможности новых границ экономической структуры 
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В статье рассматривается давний спор между дисциплинами социальных наук о том, 
что рыночная экономика и моральная экономика явно отличаются и даже противоре-
чивы. Эта дискуссия так и не была решена и остается проблематичной, поскольку обе 
стороны не рассматривали ни конкурирующие требования, ни эмпирическую реаль-
ность с достаточной тщательностью. Автор предлагает обратиться к первоначальной 
дискуссии Скотта—Попкина еще раз, исследуя, являются ли объяснения моральной 
экономики и рыночной экономики взаимодополняющими, а не противоречивыми. Со-
гласно его мнению, рыночная и моральная экономики, как явления, взаимосвязаны, и 
в рамках надлежащего подхода и обрамление (нормы), и решения (расчет) рассматри-
ваются как часть области исследования. Агенты исторически формулировали мораль-
ную экономию норм, а также интересов, тем самым поддерживая рыночную и другие 
экономики. Автор предлагает три возможных варианта (возможности) будущей струк-
туры моральной экономики: моральная экономика как преобразующая; моральная 
экономика как закрепленная в конкретных сущностях, а не как свободно плавающие 
нормы; и моральная экономика как множественная, встроенная в полевые контексты. 
Используя эти подходы к моральной экономике, в статье приводятся краткие примеры 
экономических преобразований, в которых задействованы не только интересы и рын-
ки, но и моральные требования.
Ключевые слова: моральная экономика, экономическое развитие, интересы, нормы, 
поля, экономическая история.
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